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1 Introduction
Cooperative communications and the relay channel are two very active fields of
information theory. Surprisingly, the problem of communication relaying has
also been deeply studied over the last years by the security community: re-
laying messages is the basic mechanism to mount man in the middle attacks
(MITMs). In practice, the simple act of relaying messages at the physical
layer level is enough to break the most complex authentication protocols as
shown by Desmedt et al. [1]. Since then, the so-called relay attacks have been
demonstrated against various wireless technologies [2] [3] such as RFID [4],
Bluethooth [5], and even smartcards [6]. Moreover, relay attacks can be used
as a mean to implement more advanced attacks such as wormhole in wireless
sensor networks (WSNs) [7].
Brands and Chaum proposed in [8] a first solution to relay attacks: dis-
tance bounding protocols. These protocols deal with the different variants of
relay attacks, i.e. the mafia fraud, the terrorist fraud and the distance fraud.
Fundamentally, a distance bounding protocol is a process between two parties,
i.e. the verifier V and the prover P , that combines authentication and distance
upper-bounding. An overview of the existing solutions as well as definitions are
to be found in [9].
Ultra-wideband (UWB) communication is a promising candidate for the im-
plementation of distance bounding protocols [10, 11]. An UWB system offers
fine time resolution and synchronization which are critical to measure the time
of flight to obtain distance or location [12]. Some recent works [13, 11] have
discussed many issues on the implementation of a distance bounding protocol
on an UWB radio.
This work presents two approaches to include distance bounding protocols
on time-hopping UWB impulse radio (TH-UWB-IR or simply TH-UWB) in
order to thwart the Mafia frauds. Some early results of this work are to be
presented by the authors at Globecomm 2010 [14]. The main features of the
TH-UWB radio are the time-hopping code and the mapping code. The first
scheme proposed keeps the time-hopping code secret and the mapping code
public. In the second scheme, the roles are swapped. The security and memory
consumption of these protocols are analyzed and compared to existing distance
bounding protocols for different modulation schemes, i.e. PPM and OOK. The
security analysis is organized in two steps. The security of each protocol is
assessed in a noise-free environment. Then, noise is considered. In the existing
literature [15, 16, 11, 17], the noise is often modeled with the bit error rate
(BER) independently from the radio technology. The proposed security analysis
includes more radio parameters such as the modulation, the channel model or
the receiver architecture. The benefits of adapting distance bounding protocols
to the TH-UWB are established.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the physical
layer of the UWB link and presents the distance bounding protocols and more
precisely the Hancke and Khun protocol [13]. In Section 3, a distance bounding
protocol with a secret time-hopping code is introduced and analyzed. The im-
pact of the modulation is also discussed. The Section 4 is devoted to the use of
a secret mapping code. Finally, the Section 5 compares the results of this paper
in terms of security and memory consumption to the state of the art.
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2 Preliminaries
2.1 Time-Hopping UWB
UWB-IR (Ultra Wideband-Impulse Radio) is a transmission scheme which con-
sists in the emission of very short temporal pulses with low duty cycle. These
pulses occupy a broad spectrum in the order of GHz. Time-hopping in UWB
systems provides the capacity of medium accessing [18]. It is also a way of
smoothing the radiated spectrum to optimize the transmission power. The aim
of this subsection is to detail the modeling of a TH-UWB radio.
2.1.1 Structure of a TH-UWB symbol
A TH-UWB symbol of duration Ts is composed of Nf frames each of duration
Tf . The frame contains also Nc chips whose duration is Tc. The frame includes
only one pulse associated to the information symbol. A pulse being very short,
it does not occupy all the duration of the chip. A time-hopping code sequence
S over Z/NcZ determines the chip occupied by the pulse in each frame.
The TH-UWB symbol contains redundancy: several pulses are transmitted
per symbol. A mapping code C of length Nf corresponds the binary symbols 0
or 1 to their respective pulses modulation. A repetition mapping code is often
used, i.e. the Nf pulses are similarly modulated [19]. However, other mapping
codes are possible for instance the following code has been proposed in [20]
(Nf = 4):
C =
{
0, 1, 0, 1 if the symbol is equal to 0,
1, 0, 1, 0 if the symbol is equal to 1.
(1)
Different modulation options have been suggested for UWB systems like
BPSK, PPM and OOK. More details on modulations for UWB systems can be
found in [21]. The PPM and OOK modulations are used in the following. A
TH-UWB symbol is depicted for PPM (resp. OOK) in Fig. 1 (resp. Fig. 2).
The expressions of the signal transmitted with PPM and OOK are:
sPPM (t) =
+∞∑
k=−∞
Nf−1∑
j=0
p
(
t− k.Ts − Sj(k).Tc − Cj(k).δ
)
, (2)
sOOK(t) =
+∞∑
k=−∞
Nf−1∑
j=0
Cj(k) · p
(
t− k.Ts − Sj(k).Tc
)
, (3)
where p
(
t
)
is the pulse shape and δ is the delay introduced by PPM.
The protocols proposed in this paper are based on the parameters of the
TH-UWB symbol: the time-hopping code S and the mapping code C.
2.1.2 Channel model
The received signal after passing through the channel can be modeled as:
r(t) =
∑
j
Aj .s
(
t− τj) + w(t), (4)
where s(t) is the signal transmitted for one of the two modulations. The Aj ’s
denote the path amplitudes while the τj ’s denote their corresponding delays.
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Figure 1: Structure of a TH-UWB symbol with Nc = 3, Nf = 4, PPM modu-
lation and a mapping code like Equation 1.
Figure 2: Structure of a TH-UWB symbol with Nc = 3, Nf = 4, OOK modu-
lation and a mapping code like Equation 1.
A statistical channel model recommended by the IEEE 802.15.4a standard is
adopted and particularly the CM1 model describing residential LOS (Line of
sight) environment [22]. The frame duration Tf should be chosen such that
the delay spread of the channel is much smaller than Tf . Thus, inter-pulses
interferences can be neglected. The term w(t) is a centered Gaussian random
variable modeling the thermal noise whose two sided power spectral density is
N0/2.
2.1.3 Receiver structure
Different receiver architectures have been proposed for UWB systems [23]. The
non-coherent receiver, with low cost/consumption characteristics, is chosen in
this paper. For a complete study of non-coherent receivers in UWB systems,
see [24] [25]. The purpose of this paragraph is to give a model for the perfor-
mance of a non-coherent receiver with the two modulations.
• Synchronization: Prior to data demodulation, a precise synchroniza-
tion should be acquired between the transmitter and the receiver in or-
der to detect the short pulses. Synchronization is acquired thanks to
a packet preamble composed of unmodulated symbols with a predefined
time-hopping code known to the receiver [26]. The latter compares tem-
poral distances between the received pulses and those predicted by the
predefined time-hopping code. Synchronization is declared when the TH
sequence is fully identified [27]. Synchronization is a critical phase in
UWB systems: the number of required pulses to acquire the synchroniza-
tion is independent of the payload size. This implies that the energetic
cost of synchronization becomes predominant in the consumption required
for receiving a packet, when dealing with short packets.
RR n° 7385
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• Demodulation: The demodulation scheme is depicted in Fig. 3 (resp.
Fig. 4) for the PPM (resp. OOK). In both cases, the demodulator consists
in a band-pass filter with bandwidth B, a quadratic detector coupled
with an integrator whose integration time is T . A decision is taken by
comparing the output of integrators in the two positions for the PPM
demodulator. The OOK demodulator takes a decision by comparing the
output of the integrator with a threshold ρ.
• Error probability: The performance of the two structures of reception
has been studied analytically in [28] [29]. The chip error probabilities
Pe,chip for the two modulations are:
Pe,chip,PPM =
1
2M
e
−
µ(T )Ep
2N0
M−1∑
j=0
cj ·
(µ(T )Ep
2N0
)j
, (5)
Pe,chip,OOK =
1
2
[
1−QM
(√4µ(T )Ep
N0
,
√
2ρ
N0
)
+ e−
ρ
N0
M−1∑
j=0
1
j!
( ρ
N0
)j]
.
(6)
Ep refers to the mean pulse energy while µ(T ) is referring to the proportion
of energy collected in the integrator output. More details on the last term
are left to the next paragraph. M is linked to the receiver parameters such
that: 2M ∼= (2.B.T + 1). QM (a, b) is the generalized Marcum Q function
of order M whose explicit expression can be found in [28]. Finally, the
term cj is defined by:
cj =
1
j!
M−1∑
k=j
2−k ·
(
M + k − 1
k − j
)
.
It can be seen from Equation 6 that the performance of OOK receiver
depends on the threshold ρ. The optimal threshold in the sense of the
maximum likelihood criterion can be approximated by [29]:
ρopt
N0
≈ E
2N0
+M +
√
M − 1 · φ(2E
N0
),
where E = µ(T ) · Ep and φ is a tabulated function depending only on
E/N0. It has been shown in [28] that the performance of OOK receiver is
slightly better than PPM receiver.
An upper-bound on the symbol error probability related to the chip error
probability is given by [30]:
Pes ≤
Nf∑
j=t+1
(
Nf
j
)
· (Pe,chip)j · (1− Pe,chip)Nf−j , (7)
where t =
⌊
Nf−1
2
⌋
is the error correction capacity of the mapping code C.
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• Collected energy: The pulse energy is dispersed among the paths and
the amount of energy available in the integrator output is only a proportion
of the pulse energy. The collected energy depends on the integration time
and the multipath channel realization. Dubouloz et al. proposed in [31] a
semi-analytical model to fit the statistics of µ(T ). The model consists in:
µ(T ) = 1− exp(−(T + T0
τ
)α)
, T > 0, (8)
where the parameters T0, τ and α depend on the channel configuration.
The parameters fitting the 802.15.4a CM1 channel model are: T0 = 10,
τ = 36.21 and α = 1.27 [31].
Finally, it should be noticed that the integration time influences the re-
ceiver performance. An optimal integration time exits but it is not the
concern of this paper. A short fixed integration time is assumed.
Figure 3: PPM demodulator. Figure 4: OOK demodulator.
2.2 Distance Bounding protocols
2.2.1 Basic concepts
Distance Bounding protocols have been introduced by Brands and Chaum [8]
to mitigate certain classes of man in the middle (MITM) attack described by
Desmedt et al. [1] and also known as Mafia frauds. The principle of the Mafia
frauds includes two accomplices working together: the proxy verifier located in
the radio range of the legitimate prover and the proxy prover located in the
neighborhood of the verifier. The communication between the two accomplices
may be wireless or a sophisticated wired link. The proxy prover forwards to her
accomplice all the requests from the verifier. The accomplice (proxy verifier)
sends them to the legitimate prover, receives its responses, which are forwarded
to the verifier through the two accomplices.
A distance bounding protocol allows a verifier V to check that a legiti-
mate user, the prover P, is within its neighborhood, i.e. the Euclidean distance
between the verifier and the prover is upper bounded. It has two sides: a cryp-
tographic side to authenticate the prover and a measurement side to bound the
distance. The distance bounding protocol is said to be secure if the verifier
rejects the prover with overwhelming probability when the prover is not legiti-
mate and/or it is outside of the neighborhood. The verifier accepts the prover
when the latter is legitimate and within the neighborhood. Many solutions are
available to measure the distance between two radio devices: GPS, RTT, RSSI,
AoA. . . The reader can consult [32] for more details on these techniques. For
low cost embedded devices, the RTT (Round Trip Time) is the most popular
RR n° 7385
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solution. The UWB technology is so far the most promising radio for the imple-
mentation of distance bounding protocols based on the measurement of RTT,
(see [10, 11]) as UWB provides a very accurate synchronization between the
verifier and the prover .
Most of the existing distance bounding protocols based on the RTT proposed
in the literature [33, 15, 34] are variants of two fundamental solutions: the
Brands and Chaum protocol [8] and the Hancke and Kuhn protocol [13].
Prover P Verifier V
k ∈ {0, 1}m, f k ∈ {0, 1}m, f
Slow phase:
NV←−−−−−−−−−−−− Picks NV
Picks NP
NP−−−−−−−−−−−−→
H2n = f(k,NP , NV )
R0 = H1 · · ·Hn
R1 = Hn+1 · · ·H2n
Picks c ∈ {0, 1}n
Fast phase:
For i = 1 · · ·n
ci←−−−−−−−−−−− Sends ci
Sends ri = R
ci
i
ri−−−−−−−−−−−→ Measure of RTT: δti
Figure 5: The Hancke and Kuhn protocol.
The latter protocol is depicted in Fig. 5. It is composed of two steps: the
slow phase and the fast phase. The protocol requires that V and P agree on: (a)
a shared secret key k ∈ {0, 1}m, (b) a pseudo-random function f , (c) a number
of rounds n of the fast phase and (d) an upper-bound tmax for timing known to
the verifier.
The slow phase begins as follow: the verifier picks a nonce NV (number
used once) and sends it to P . Reciprocally, the prover picks a nonce NP and
sends it to V . From the values NP , NV and the key k, P and V compute a
shared state H2n = f(k,NP , NV ) of length 2n bits. Then, V and P split H
2n
into two registers of length n: R0 = H1 · · ·Hn and R1 = Hn+1 · · ·H2n where
Hj , (1 ≤ j ≤ 2n) denotes the jth bit of H2n.
The fast phase consists in n rounds. In each round i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), the verifier
picks a random bit ci (the challenge) and sends it to P . The prover responds
with ri = R
ci
i the i
th bit of the register Rci . The verifier computes in each
round the RTT between sending ci and receiving ri denoted δti. The distance
bounding protocol succeeds if all the responses ri are correct and ∀i, δti ≤ tmax.
In comparison, the Brands and Chaum protocol requires an additional phase
because the distance checking and the authentication are two independent pro-
cesses. The final slow phase in Brands and Chaum protocol is the verification
of a signature algorithm used to complete the authentication.
INRIA
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2.2.2 Strategies of attack
The adversary can choose between different strategies for executing her Mafia
fraud. The strategies depend if the adversary asks or not the prover and the
moment she asks it. One strategy may be more useful to the attacker than others
depending on the distance bounding protocol and on which class it belongs to.
• No-ask strategy: The adversary relays the initial slow phase between the
legitimate prover and the verifier. After that, the adversary tries to com-
plete the protocol by herself. This strategy can not be strictly considered
as a form of Mafia fraud. But, it is interesting to study the security of
distance bounding protocols against this type of attack. The probability
of success against the Hancke and Kuhn protocol with this strategy of
attack is:
Pna,HK =
(
1
2
)n
. (9)
• Pre-ask strategy: The adversary relays the initial slow phase. Then, before
executing the fast phase with the verifier, the proxy verifier starts the
fast phase with the legitimate prover by querying it with false challenges.
After that, the proxy prover starts the fast phase now with the verifier by
exploiting the responses in her possession. If the protocol is not finished,
the adversary relays the final slow phase. With this strategy of attack, the
adversary can retrieve one register among two in the Hancke and Kuhn
protocol and the probability of success is:
Ppa,HK =
(
3
4
)n
. (10)
The other possibility of attack is the post-ask strategy. The adversary ex-
ecutes the fast phase with the verifier without asking the prover. After that,
she queries the legitimate prover with the right challenges just extracted in the
aim of obtaining the signature of the last phase. This strategy of attack finds
application only for the Brands and Chaum’s class of protocols.
In this paper, two distance bounding protocols (protocol A and protocol B)
are introduced on a TH-UWB radio using PPM and OOK modulations. The
verifier and the prover are two UWB devices with identical capabilities. The
core of our protocols follows the principle of the Hancke and Kuhn’s protocol. A
preliminary version of this work was accepted at Globecomm 2010 [14]. These
early results have been completed to provide an in-depth analysis of our dis-
tance bounding protocols. The major new aspects treated by this article are
briefly summarized here. First, the protocol A using secret time-hopping codes
has been generalized for a variable number of listening slots and for different
modulations. Second, the analysis over noisy channel is more realistic for both
protocols as a complete UWB link has been considered. Finally, the memory
cost has been explored to provide a fair comparison with the state of the art.
3 Protocol A: secret TH codes
The main idea of protocol A is to adapt the Hancke and Khun protocol to a
TH-UWB radio by using secret shared time-hopping codes between V and P .
The principle of the protocol is detailed and then analyzed.
RR n° 7385
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3.1 Description of the protocol
The protocol is described in Fig. 6. It is assumed that synchronization is per-
formed between the verifier and the legitimate prover prior to the start of the
protocol and that it is maintained. In practice, radio transceivers own an elec-
tronic circuit responsible for synchronization tracking. Moreover, the mapping
code used by the verifier and the prover is the one given in Equation 1. In what
follows, the specifications of the protocol are mentioned.
3.1.1 Protocol requirements
P and V share a secret key k. They can both compute a pseudo-random function
f and they have an access to a random number generator. The pseudo-random
function can be implemented with a cryptographic hash function such as SHA-
256. V and P share also a parameter N ′ ∈ {1, · · · , Nc − 1}. The verifier sets a
timing upper-bound tmax.
3.1.2 Initialization phase
The prover picks a nonce NP and sends it to V . Reciprocally, the verifier picks
a nonce NV and sends it to P . From the values NV , NP and the key k, V
and P compute a share state H = f(k,NP , NV ). H is a bit string of length
2n(p.Nf +1) where n is the number of rounds in the fast phase and p = log2Nc.
For an ease of implementation, the number of chips Nc is always a power of two.
H is split into four parts:
• The time-hopping code SV of the verifier of length n.p.Nf bits. It defines
the n.Nf time slots used by the verifier to transmit its pulses. For 1 ≤ i ≤
n, the bit string SVi of length p.Nf bits determines the sequence of integers
over Z/NcZ corresponding to time slots used to emit the i
th symbol.
• The time-hopping code SP of the prover which defines the time slots used
for transmitting the symbols of the prover.
• A first register R0 containing n bits.
• A second register R1 which contains also n bits.
In addition, the verifier and the prover pick an n-bit random vector c and z.
The prover also picks randomly an n.p.Nf -bit vector q. This vector is decom-
posed into a sequence qi of n symbols with p.Nf bits as S
P
i and S
V
i .
The protocol requires also for both verifier and prover (n·Nf ) random binary
words of length (Nc − 1) and weight N ′. The purpose of these binary words
is to determine the additional listening slots in each frame, besides the time
slot allocated to receive the answer. The additional slots are used to detect an
attack.
3.1.3 Fast phase
The fast phase consists in n rounds. In each frame of a round, both V and P
activate their radio in N ′ time slots selected from the binary word of length
(Nc − 1). Thus, they can detect an attack if they notice an activity in these
time slots. The fast phase starts by sending a challenge bit ci to P . Each
INRIA
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challenge is sent according to the public mapping code in time slots defined
by SVi . If the prover receives the pulses in the time slots predicted, it replies
with ri = R
ci
i the i
th bit of the register Rci with the time-hopping sequence
SPi . Otherwise (P detects at least one pulse in the wrong time slot), the prover
notifies an attack and reacts by replying from the vector z with the symbol qi.
Reciprocally, the verifier also assumes an attack if it receives an impulse not in
the time slot predicted and stops the protocol. Unless an attack is detected,
the verifier computes in each round the RTT, denoted δti, between sending ci
and receiving ri. This RTT measure is linked to the time of flight so a distance
upper-bound between V and P can be deduced.
3.1.4 Verification
The protocol succeeds if all the responses ri sent by the prover are correct and
∀i, δti ≤ tmax.
Prover P Verifier V
k ∈ {0, 1}m, f k ∈ {0, 1}m, f
Picks NP
NP−−−−−−−−−−−−→
NV←−−−−−−−−−−−− Picks NV
f(k,NP , NV ) f(k,NP , NV )
Picks z ∈ {0, 1}n Picks c ∈ {0, 1}n
Picks q ∈ {0, 1}n.p.Nf
For i = 1 · · ·n
ci←−−−−−−−−−−− Sends ci with SVi
If correct time slots then
ri = R
ci
i
t = SPi
else
ri = zi
t = qi
Sends ri with t
ri−−−−−−−−−−−→ If correct time slots then
Measure of RTT: δti
else
Stops the protocol
Figure 6: Protocol A: secret TH codes.
3.2 Security analysis over noise-free channels
A detailed security analysis of protocol A for the no-ask and pre-ask strategies
of attack is given. In this subsection, the security is analyzed in an idealistic
case with noise-free channel. The analysis is considered for the two modulation
options: PPM and OOK. Indeed, the security is different with OOK because
chips 0 and 1 are not symmetric.
3.2.1 PPM Modulation
No-ask strategy - The adversary responds to the challenges of the verifier
with random bits rˆi. The response bit is transmitted with its corresponding
public mapping code. Specifically, the adversary emits in each frame x pulses
RR n° 7385
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at different time slots, x ∈ {1, · · · , Nc−N ′}. To compute the adversary success
probability, it is helpful to define the following events at the ith round:
- Ai the event that rˆi = R
ci
i ,
- Bi the event that the adversary emits one pulse among x in the true time
slot SPi in each frame,
- Ci the event that the adversary emits x pulses in time slots that are not
detected by V in each frame.
The adversary succeeds her attack at the ith round if the event (Ai and Bi and Ci)
is realized. The probability for this event is:
P (Ai and Bi and Ci) = P (Ai) · P (Bi and Ci)
= P (Ai) · P (Ci|Bi) · P (Bi)
=
1
2
.
[(
Nc−(1+N
′)
x−1
)
(
Nc−1
x−1
) · x
Nc
]Nf
Let denote Y = x.
(
Nc−(1+N
′)
x−1
)
/Nc.
(
Nc−1
x−1
)
. Assuming that the success proba-
bility at each round is independent, the total success probability against protocol
A with the no-ask strategy is given by:
Pna,PPM,A =
(
Y Nf
2
)n
. (11)
It is interesting for the adversary to choose the optimal number of pulses
xopt to transmit in order to maximize her probability of success. The problem
of optimization in N turns into:
xopt = arg max
1≤x≤Nc−N ′
Y . (12)
The value xopt that maximizes the success probability is:
xopt =
⌈
Nc −N ′
N ′ + 1
⌉
. (13)
It should be noticed that when N ′ ≥ Nc/2, the optimal value is xopt = 1.
Moreover, considering values of N ′ greater than Nc/2 does not improve the
security.
Pre-ask strategy - During the attack, the adversary queries P with chal-
lenges cˆi chosen randomly. She emits in each frame x pulses, x ∈ {1, · · · , Nc −
N ′} in random time slots. After receiving the answers ri from P , the adversary
now executes the protocol with V . She answers to V challenges with rˆi = ri
emitted in same time slots as received. So, in each frame, the adversary re-
sponds with only one pulse. In addition to the events already introduced, the
following events are defined at the ith round :
- Ei the event that cˆi = ci,
- Fi the event that the adversary emits one pulse among x in the true time
slot SVi in each frame,
- Gi the event that the adversary emits x pulses in time slots that are not
detected by P in each frame.
INRIA
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The attack succeeds at the ith round if the event (Ai andBi) is realized with
x = 1. The probability of this event P (Ai andBi) = P (Ai) ·P (Bi) is computed:
P (Ai) = P (Ai|(Ei and Fi and Gi)) · P (Ei and Fi and Gi)
+ P (Ai|Ei and Fi and Gi) · P (Ei and Fi and Gi)
= 1 · Y
Nf
2
+
1
2
· (1− Y
Nf
2
)
P (Bi) = P (Bi|(Fi and Gi)) · P (Fi and Gi)
+ P (Bi|Fi and Gi) · P (Fi and Gi)
= 1 · Y Nf + 1
N
Nf
c
· (1− Y Nf )
Therefore, the probability of success against protocol A with the PPM mod-
ulation is given by:
Ppa,PPM,A =
([ (NNfc − 1).Y Nf + 1
N
Nf
c
] · [2 + Y Nf
4
])n
. (14)
The adversary searches the number of pulses to emit for maximizing her
probability of success. The equivalent optimization problem turns into max-
imizing an increasing function of Y so the solution is the same as previously
given by Equation 13.
Comparing strategies - The security of protocol A is fixed by the max(Pna,PPM,A, Ppa,PPM,A).
To determine the best strategy for the adversary, the ratio Ppa,PPM,A/Pna,PPM,A
is computed:
Ppa,PPM,A
Pna,PPM,A
=
(
2(Nc · Y )Nf + . . .
2(Nc · Y )Nf
)n
≥ 1.
Thus, the pre-ask strategy is better for the adversary.
The Fig. 7 depicts the impact of N ′ on the success probability for n = 15.
The probability of success decreases rapidly for 1 ≤ N ′ < Nc/2 and becomes
constant from N ′ ≥ Nc/2 as noticed previously.
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Figure 7: Adversary success probability of protocol A as a function of N ′ with
PPM modulation, Nc = 8 and Nf = 1.
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3.2.2 OOK Modulation
With the PPM modulation, the adversary is detected when she emits in the
wrong time slots. However, with OOK modulation, the adversary is detected
if she emits in the wrong time slots if and only if the chip is 1. Therefore,
the security differs with OOK. The mapping code C used in protocol A is like
Equation 1, so the same number of pulses is transmitted for symbols 0 and 1
which equals Nf/2. The probability of success is computed just with the pre-ask
strategy as demonstrated that it is better for the adversary.
In comparison to the previous computation of PPM, the following values are
modified:
P (Fi and Gi) = Y
Nf/2,
P (Bi) =
(N
Nf/2
c − 1)UNf/2 + 1
N
Nf/2
c
,
where U =
(
Nc−N
′
x
)
/
(
Nc
x
)
. The event Bi becomes independent of the event Fi
because the prover is not susceptible to detect an attack when it does not receive
a pulse in the predicted time slot. Finally, the probability of success with OOK
modulation is given by:
Ppa,OOK,A =

[ (N
Nf
2
c − 1).U
Nf
2 + 1
N
Nf
2
c
] · [2 + Y
Nf
2
4
]
n
. (15)
The number of pulses that the adversary should emit for maximizing her prob-
ability of success is similar to previously. The loss in security level with OOK
modulation compared to PPM depends on the parameters of the protocol. In
Fig. 8, the security level of protocol A with respectively PPM and OOK mod-
ulations is given with parameters Nc = 8, Nf = 2 and N
′ = 3. At the same
security level, the number of rounds necessary with OOK is approximately 2.76
higher than the number of rounds necessary with PPM.
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Figure 8: Comparison of security performance of protocol A between PPM and
OOK modulations, Nc = 8, Nf = 2 and N
′ = 3.
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3.3 Security analysis over noisy channels
In the noise-free channel, all responses sent by the prover must be correctly
received for succeeding the protocol. However, in practical systems, some re-
sponses may be erroneous due to noise. The protocol must be modified for a
noisy environment by tolerating ℓ errors in the verification phase. The number
of tolerated errors ℓ is an important security parameter, since raising ℓ decreases
the probability of false rejection but at the same time increases the probability
of false accept. The security of protocol A is discussed with the channel model
described in Subsection 2.1.
3.3.1 Probability of false rejection
The probability of false rejection is defined by the probability that the verifier
rejects a legitimate prover in absence of an attacker. This occurs when more
than ℓ errors appear. For computing this probability, the following events are
defined:
- Hi the event that the received ri 6= Rcii ,
- Ii the event that ci is correctly received,
- Ji the event that ri = R
ci
i .
The probability that a response is erroneous at the ith round corresponds to
εA = P (Hi). The probability of this event is:
εA = P (Hi|Ji) · P (Ji) + P (Hi|J¯i) · P (J¯i)
= Pes · P (Ji) + (1− Pes) · (1 − P (Ji)),
P (Ji) = P (Ji|Ii) · P (Ii) + P (Ji|I¯i) · P (I¯i)
= 1 · (1− Pes) + 1
2
· Pes,
where Pes is the symbol error probability which depends on the choice of modu-
lation and is given by Equation 7 taken with equality. In this computation, the
symbol error probability is assumed the same for the two links V ⇋ P , since
both V and P have the same capabilities. The result is:
εA =
3
2
· Pes − (Pes)2.
Finally, the probabilty of false rejection PFR,A is given by:
PFR,A =
n∑
i=ℓ+1
(
n
i
)
· εiA · (1− εA)n−i. (16)
The number of tolerated errors is chosen to be adapted to the symbol error
probability by the relation:
ℓ = ⌈εA.n⌉ . (17)
This choice requires that the verifier knows the symbol error rate of the link.
The Fig. 9 describes the probability of false rejection for the two modulations
as a function of the signal-to-noise ratio Ep/N0 with a fixed number of rounds
n = 25. The parameters of the TH-UWB link taken for studying the probability
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of false rejection are: T = 2 ns, B = 1.5 GHz and Nf = 8. For Ep/N0 < 12 dB,
the probability of false rejection is almost constant and not satisfying from the
security point of view. For Ep/N0 ≥ 12 dB, the probability of false rejection
decreases rapidly with Ep/N0. Moreover, the probability of false rejection is
better with OOK than with PPM. This result is in concordance with the fact
that the performance of OOK non-coherent receiver is slightly better than PPM
receiver.
Figure 9: Probability of false rejection of protocol A with PPM and OOK
modulations, T = 2 ns, B = 1.5 GHz and Nf = 8.
3.3.2 Probability of false accept
The fact that V tolerates some errors changes the adversary’s probability of
success: i.e. the probability of false accept. Now, the adversary needs to succeed
in only (n− j) rounds, 0 ≤ j ≤ ℓ, and the event (A¯i and Bi) must be realized in
j rounds. Thus, the probability of false accept for the two modulations is given
by:
PFA,A =
ℓ∑
j=0
(
n
j
)
·Xn−jA · ZjA . (18)
XA corresponds to the probability of success in a round for the two modulations
already computed while ZA corresponds to P (A¯i and Bi):
ZPPM,A =
( (NNfc − 1).Y Nf + 1
N
Nf
c
) · (2− Y Nf
4
)
,
ZOOK,A =
( (NNf/2c − 1).UNf/2 + 1
N
Nf/2
c
) · (2− Y Nf/2
4
)
.
The computation is established for the worst case situation of the noise resilient
protocol A consisting of an adversary capable of setting channels without errors.
The Table 1 gives the probability of false accept for different values of the
signal-to-noise-ratio. The parameters for protocol A are Nc = 4, Nf = 2,
N ′ = 2 and n = 15. The probability of false accept depends on Ep/N0 via
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the number of tolerated errors yet given by Equation 17. The behavior of
the probability of false accept is different according to which interval belongs
Ep/N0. In fact, the probability of false accept is variable in the range Ep/N0 <
16.5 dB for PPM modulation and in the range Ep/N0 < 15.5 dB for OOK
modulation. Otherwise, the probability of false accept becomes constant and
minimal. The signal-to-noise ratio required to achieve this minimal value is less
with OOK compared to PPM but the security level of the protocol is greatly
increased compared to PPM. The choice of the number of tolerated errors given
by Equation 17 guarantees that the probability of false accept becomes minimal
and independent of Ep/N0 if the latter is above a certain value. But, this
constant security level can not achieve the security level of the noise-free channel.
Ep/N0 [dB] PFA,PPM,A PFA,OOK,A
5 1.5 · 10−14 8.1 · 10−4
8 1.3 · 10−14 7.3 · 10−4
11 9.6 · 10−15 4.2 · 10−4
14 1.3 · 10−15 4.5 · 10−5
17 10−17 2 · 10−6
18 10−17 2 · 10−6
∞ (without noise) 8.54 · 10−19 1.55 · 10−7
Table 1: Probability of false accept function of the signal-to-noise ratio, Nc = 4,
Nf = N
′ = 2 and n = 15.
4 Protocol B: secret mapping codes
In the previous section, the time-hopping code was kept unknown to the ad-
versary while the mapping code was public. It is quite logical to study the
security performance of a scheme in which the time-hopping code is public and
the mapping code is unknown to the adversary.
4.1 Description of the protocol
Let consider the following encoding/decoding strategy: the encoder has to send
0 or 1 message. It chooses randomly Nf bits to obtain a codeword y. If the
most significant bit of y is set to one, y is associated to 1 or 0 otherwise. The
encoder sends y or y. To achieve a successful decoding, the decoder needs to be
synchronized with the encoder to know the value of y. If the received symbol
is at distance ∆ ≤ ⌊Nf−12 ⌋ of y (resp. y), the decoding is successful otherwise
it errs. To transmit n bits, the encoder and the decoder need to draw Nf · n
random bits. The goal of ∆ is to offer a trade-off between error correction and
security. Taking ∆ = 0 is more beneficial to security while taking ∆ ≥ 1 is more
beneficial to error correction.
In fact, the strategy just described consists in using the cosets of a repetition
code of length Nf and dimension 1. The encoder and the decoder are encod-
ing/decoding with a known coset of the repetition code. One element of each
coset is associated to 0 and the other to 1. For instance, the cosets used by the
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encoder and the decoder are forNf = 4: K1 = {0000, 1111},K2 = {0001, 1110},
K3 = {0010, 1101}, K4 = {0011, 1100}, K5 = {0100, 1011}, K6 = {0101, 1010},
K7 = {0110, 1001}, K8 = {0111, 1000}. To transit n bits, the encoder and the
decoder need to draw (Nf−1)·n random bits while storing in memory Nf2Nf−1
bits for the cosets. If Nf2
Nf−1 is negligible compared to n, almost n bits can
be saved compared to the previous strategy.
The protocol B is depicted in Fig. 10. Its requirements are the same as
protocol A with the addition of the cosets.
Prover P Verifier V
k ∈ {0, 1}m, f k ∈ {0, 1}m, f
Picks NP
NP−−−−−−−−−−−−→
NV←−−−−−−−−−−−− Picks NV
f(k,NP , NV ) f(k,NP , NV )
Picks q ∈ {0, 1}n(Nf−1) Picks c ∈ {0, 1}n
For i = 1 · · ·n
If correct mapping then
ci←−−−−−−−−−−− Sends ci with KVi
ri = R
ci
i
K = KPi
else
K = qi
Sends ri with K
ri−−−−−−−−−−−→ Measure of RTT: δti
Figure 10: Protocol B: secret mapping codes.
4.1.1 Initialization phase
The prover and the verifier exchange the nonces NP and NV . Then, they both
compute the share state H = f(k,NP , NV ) which is split into four parts:
• The register KV of length n.(Nf − 1) bits. It defines the successive cosets
KVi used by the verifier at each round i.
• In the same vain, the register KP of length n.(Nf − 1) bits defines the
cosets KPi used by the prover.
• A register R0 containing n bits.
• A register R1 which contains also n bits.
In addition, the verifier and the prover pick respectively an n-bit random vector
c and an n.(Nf − 1)-bit vector q. This vector q has the same purpose than KV
and KP but it will be used in case of incorrect challenge.
4.1.2 Fast phase
During each round i ∈ {1, · · · , n}, the verifier sends a challenge bit ci to the
prover. This challenge bit is transformed into a codeword from the coset KVi .
The prover decodes the received challenge with respect to KVi . If the decoding
is successful, i.e. the received challenge is at Hamming distance ∆ from one
of the two words of the coset, the prover responds with ri = R
ci
i the i
th bit
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of the register Rci . This answer bit is transformed into a codeword from the
coset KPi . Otherwise if the decoding errs, the prover detects an attack and
responds randomly. This random answer is coded with respect to a mapping
code extracted from q. The verifier computes in each round the RTT δti.
4.1.3 Verification
The protocol succeeds if the verifier decodes successfully the answers received
from the prover and if ∀i, δti ≤ tmax.
4.2 Security analysis over noise-free channels
In the protocol B, the time-hopping code is public meaning that the adversary
knows when the information is transmitted. Therefore, the security of protocol
B is independent of the type of modulation and either PPM or OOK can be
assumed. In a first time, it is assumed that no noise is tolerated, ∆ = 0.
No-ask strategy - The adversary attempts to answer to the verifier chal-
lenges with randomly chosen mapping codes. The following events are defined:
- Ki(∆) the event that the mapping code of rˆi is at an Hamming distance
less than ∆ from the mapping code of the correct answer ri = R
ci
i .
The probability of success with the no-ask strategy in the ith round corre-
sponds to P (Ki(0)) = 1/2
Nf . Thus, the probability of success with this strategy
of attack is given by:
Pna,B =
(
1
2Nf
)n
. (19)
Pre-ask strategy - The adversary queries the prover with challenges sent
with randomly chosen mapping codes. For computing the probability of success
with this strategy of attack, the following event is defined:
- Li(∆) the event that cˆi is sent with a mapping code distant at most ∆
from one of the two codewords of the coset KVi .
The probability of success in the ith round corresponds to the probability of
event Ki(0):
P (Ki(0)) = P (Ki(0)|Li(0)) · P (Li(0))
+ P (Ki(0)|Li(0)) · P (Li(0))
=
3
4
· 1
2Nf−1
+
1
2Nf
· (1− 1
2Nf−1
).
Thus, the probability of success with the pre-ask strategy is:
Ppa,B =
(
1
2Nf
· (5
2
− 1
2Nf−1
)
)n
. (20)
4.3 Security analysis over noisy channels
As for protocol A, the probability of false rejection and the probability of false
accept are computed using the channel model described in Subsection 2.1.
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4.3.1 Probability of false rejection
The following event is introduced:
- Mi the event that the received mapping code of ri is at Hamming distance
> ∆ from the mapping code of Rcii .
The ith round fails if the event Mi is realized. To compute εB = P (Mi), this
complete system of events is defined at the ith round:
- Ni,1 the event that a codeword is received with a number of erroneous chips
≤ ∆,
- Ni,2 the event that a codeword is received with a number of erroneous chips
strictly including between ∆ and Nf −∆,
- Ni,3 the event that a codeword is received with a number of erroneous chips
≥ Nf −∆.
εB = P (Mi|Ni,1) · P (Ni,1) + P (Mi|Ni,2) · P (Ni,2)
+ P (Mi|Ni,3) · P (Ni,3)
= Pes ·Q1 +
1−∑∆j=0 (Nfj )
2Nf
·Q2
+
Q3
2
· (Pes +Q1 +Q2),
where Pes is the symbol error probability of the link for the two modulations yet
given by Equation 7 except that now t the error correction capacity for protocol
B equals ∆. The terms Q1, Q2 and Q3 are defined such that:
Q1 = P (Ni,1) =
∆∑
j=0
(
Nf
j
)
.(Pe,chip)
j .(1− Pe,chip)Nf−j ,
Q3 = P (Ni,3) =
Nf∑
j=Nf−∆
(
Nf
j
)
.(Pe,chip)
j .(1− Pe,chip)Nf−j ,
Q2 = 1−
(
Q1 +Q3
)
,
where Pe,chip refers to the chip error probability of the two modulations. Thus,
the probability of false rejection is given by:
PFR,B =
n∑
i=ℓ+1
(
n
i
)
· εiB · (1− εB)n−i . (21)
The number of tolerated errors chosen is such that:
ℓ = ⌈εB.n⌉ . (22)
Fig. 11 depicts the probability of false rejection of protocols A and B as a
function of the signal-to-noise ratio. Parameters of the TH-UWB link are the
same as previously, PPM modulation is considered and n = 25. Protocol B is
studied with the two following limit cases ∆ = 0 with no error correction and
∆ = 3 corresponding to a maximal error correction capacity. The probabilities
of false rejection of protocols A and B (∆ = 3) are very close. This can be
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explained by the fact that both have the same error correction capacity. The
probability of false rejection of protocol B with ∆ = 3 (resp. ∆ = 0) becomes a
decreasing function from Ep/N0 = 12 dB (resp. Ep/N0 = 18 dB). To guarantee
a probability of false rejection of 10−6, the signal-to-noise ratio required is of
about 15.5 dB for ∆ = 3 and about 21.5 dB for ∆ = 0. This result points
out that taking ∆ = 0 and so exploiting the mapping code only for security
purposes introduces a loss of about 6 dB.
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Figure 11: Probability of false rejection of protocol B with Nf = 8, T = 2 ns,
B = 1.5 GHz and PPM modulation.
4.3.2 Probability of false accept
Tolerating some erroneous responses changes the success probability of the at-
tack. The strategy of attack considered here is the pre-ask strategy. Now, the
adversary needs to succeed in only (n− j) rounds, j ∈ {0, · · · , ℓ}, and the event
Pi(∆) must be realized in j rounds. The event Pi(∆) is defined by:
- Pi(∆) the event that the mapping code of rˆi is at Hamming distance less
than ∆ from the wrong codeword of the coset KPi .
The probability of false accept of protocol B is given by:
PFA,B =
ℓ∑
j=0
(
n
j
)
·Xn−jB · ZjB, (23)
where:
XB = P (Ki(∆)) =
∑∆
k=0
(
Nf
k
)
2Nf
· (5
2
−
∑∆
k=0
(
Nf
k
)
2Nf−1
)
,
ZB = P (Pi(∆)) =
∑∆
k=0
(
Nf
k
)
2Nf
· (3
2
−
∑∆
k=0
(
Nf
k
)
2Nf−1
)
.
The probability of false accept depends on Ep/N0 via the number of tolerated
errors given by Equation 22. The parameters of the TH-UWB link are the same
as previously. Two values of ∆ are considered here, ∆ = 3 and an intermediate
value ∆ = 2. The conclusion from Fig. 12 is that the probability of false accept
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decreases with Ep/N0 until achieving a constant and minimal value. This value
is reached with Ep/N0 = 12 dB, ∆ = 3 and Ep/N0 = 13.5 dB, ∆ = 2. The
security level with ∆ = 3 is not sufficient and considering ∆ = 2 instead of
∆ = 3 improves greatly the security and reduces little the robustness. Moreover,
protocol B with ∆ = 2 guarantees a certain security level for low Ep/N0. The
only drawback compared to ∆ = 3 consists in the fact that it reaches the
minimal probability value with a loss of 1.5 dB in the signal-to-noise ratio. The
choice ∆ = 2 offers a good tradeoff between security and robustness.
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Figure 12: Probability of false accept of protocol B over noisy channels, Nf = 8.
5 Comparison with different distance bounding
protocols
In this section, figure of merits of protocols A and B are compared to the stan-
dard protocol of Hancke and Khun and one variant the MUSE-pHK [35]. The
considered metrics are the security performance and the memory consumption.
5.1 Security performance comparison
5.1.1 Noise-free channels
Table 2 resumes the success probabilities against protocol A (PPM), protocol B,
the Hancke and Khun protocol [13] and the MUSE-pHK protocol [35]. In Fig.
13, the curves of the success probabilities are plotted with the following values:
protocol A (Nc = 8, Nf = 1 and N
′ ∈ {1, 4}), protocol B (Nf = 3, ∆ = 0) and
p = 8. These parameters are chosen to ensure fair comparison. Clearly, protocol
A offers the best security level and outperforms the MUSE-8HK for all values
of N ′. Protocol B offers a security level slightly less than MUSE-8HK. The
counterpart of the security performance of protocol A compared to protocol B
is the additional energy consumption required for activating radio in some time
slots.
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Protocol P
HK
(
3/4
)n
MUSE-pHK
(
(2.p− 1)/p2)n
A (PPM)
([ (NNfc −1).Y Nf+1
N
Nf
c
] · [ 2+Y Nf4 ]
)n
B
(
1
2Nf
· (52 − 12Nf−1 )
)n
Table 2: Security comparison of distance bounding protocols.
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Figure 13: Security comparison of distance bounding protocols: A (PPM, Nc =
8, Nf = 1), B (Nf = 3, ∆ = 0) and MUSE-pHK (p = 8).
5.1.2 Noisy channels
The resiliency of protocols A and B to noise is compared to the HK and MUSE-
pHK protocols. Table 3 shows the probabilities of false accept already computed
as a function of ℓ. Parameters of protocol A are: Nc = 8, Nf = 1, N
′ = 1 and
PPM modulation is used. In HK and MUSE-pHK protocols, error correction
is not considered. Thus, to simply draw fair conditions of comparison, ∆ is set
to 0 and Nf equals 3 for protocol B. The number of rounds n is fixed to 25 for
all the protocols. The conclusion to be drawn is that protocol A offers the best
security level in presence of errors even with a minimal value N ′ = 1. Protocol
B, in contrast to the case of noise-free channel, can outperform the MUSE-
8HK protocol in relatively heavy noisy environment (number of tolerated errors
ℓ ≥ 3).
5.2 Memory consumption comparison
The initial phase of protocols A and B requires the use of registers to store
bit elements necessary for the execution of the protocol. Table 4 presents the
memory consumption in term of the number of bits stored by each protocol.
The comparison is first made on the base of a fixed common number of rounds
n. For parameters chosen to ensure fair comparison between A, B and MUSE-
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ℓ HK MUSE-8HK A (PPM) B
5 3.78 · 10−1 3.76 · 10−9 3 · 10−13 7.62 · 10−11
4 2.13 · 10−1 2.7 · 10−10 10−13 2.81 · 10−11
3 9.62 · 10−2 1.74 · 10−11 2 · 10−14 8.47 · 10−12
2 3.21 · 10−2 5.81 · 10−13 3.5 · 10−15 1.81 · 10−12
1 7 · 10−3 1.46 · 10−14 4 · 10−16 2.51 · 10−13
Table 3: Security comparison of distance bounding protocols in noisy channels,
A (Nc = 8, Nf = 1, N
′ = 1) and B (Nf = 3, ∆ = 0).
pHK protocols, the memory consumption is minimal for protocol B. Protocol A
guarantees a lower memory consumption than MUSE-pHK for Nc = p ≥ 8.
Protocols Memory consumption
HK 2.n
MUSE-pHK n.p. log2 p
A n.(3.Nf . log2Nc + 3 +Nf .(Nc − 1))
B n.(3.Nf − 1)
Table 4: Memory consumption comparison for different distance bounding pro-
tocols.
The memory consumption comparison can be made also on the base of a
fixed common security level. In fact, n intervenes in the memory consumption
and the number of rounds required for a certain security level is not the same
for the different protocols. Thus, Table 5 depicts the memory consumption for
a fixed security level. Parameters of protocol A (resp. protocol B) are Nc = 4,
N ′ = 2 and Nf = 1 (resp. Nf = 2 and ∆ = 0). Based on Table 5, the HK
protocol is placed in first position. The protocol B is placed in second position,
followed by protocol A and finally MUSE-4HK protocol. The first position of
HK protocol hides the drawback that n is large and therefore the long run-
time of this protocol. The benefits of our proposed protocols is that protocol B
insures the same security level than MUSE-4HK with less memory consumption.
Regarding protocol A, the memory consumption and also the number of rounds
become less important than MUSE-4HK protocol, in contrast to the comparison
based on a fixed n.
6 Conclusion
Distance bounding protocols can greatly benefit from being integrated into the
physical layer of a radio system. This has been shown in this paper for the TH-
UWB radio. This technology offers two opportunities to enhance the security of
distance bounding protocols: secret time-hopping codes and/or secret mapping
codes. The impact of each strategy has been studied and it appears that secret
time-hopping codes are to be favored over secret mapping codes from a security
point of view.
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HK MUSE-4HK A (PPM) B
Probability Memory Rounds Memory Rounds Memory Rounds Memory Rounds
8.14 · 10−7 98 49 136 17 120 10 105 21
7.35 · 10−10 148 74 208 26 180 15 155 31
6.63 · 10−13 196 98 272 34 240 20 205 41
5.99 · 10−16 244 122 344 43 300 25 255 51
Table 5: Memory consumption comparison of different protocols for a fixed
security level, protocol A (Nc = 4, Nf = 1, N
′ = 2) and protocol B (Nf = 2,
∆ = 0)
The security of the proposed strategies A and B has been analyzed in noise-
free and noisy cases. The analysis takes into account the parameters of the
TH-UWB link : PPM and OOK modulations for the transmitter, the IEEE
802.15.4a CM1 multipath model for the channel and a non-coherent structure
for the receiver. The results in the noisy case have permitted to determine
the signal-to-noise ratios required to satisfy security constraints. Moreover, the
comparison of our proposed protocols to the state of the art has affirmed that
protocol A offers the best security level in both noise-free and noisy channels.
Protocol B guarantees a security level better than MUSE-pHK [35] in a noisy
environment. Furthermore, it offers a good trade-off between security and mem-
ory consumption compared to [35]. Further work will investigate the resiliency
of our protocols to the other types of relay attacks: the terrorist and the distance
frauds.
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